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ABSTRACT
Vaziri, Baback Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2016. Markov-based ranking methods.
Major Professors: Yuehwern Yih, Tom Morin.
Ranking methods are an essential tool to help make decisions. This dissertation
document examines different aspects of the theory and application of pairwise compar-
ison ranking methods, specifically those that use Markov chains. First, a new method
is developed to solve a traditional recruiting problem, and is shown to improve the
predictive power of its ranking. Next, modifications are made to an existing method
that theoretically improves the reliability, while maintaining the rank integrity. Last,
a framework is developed that defines a fair and comprehensive ranking method, and
several popular methods are evaluated in their ability to adhere to the said framework.
11. INTRODUCTION
The rank of an alternative in a set is the measure of its dominance in comparison
to the other alternatives in that set. A ranking method consists of an algorithm
that determines the rank of the alternatives. Generally, the ranking method will first
develop a rating for each alternative, and then the sorted ratings are used to obtain
a ranking. Ratings contain more information than rankings because they provide a
cardinal value that measures the worth of each alternative, whereas a ranking only
contains an ordinal value that measures the placing of that alternative in respect to
others. Oftentimes, however, we are only concerned with making a decision or predic-
tion, and thus the ranking is sufficient. Rankings are important in many applications,
ranging from popular sports to web searches to recommender systems.
A common class of ranking methods involves observing a series of pairwise com-
parisons between the alternatives to develop a ranking. In a perfect scenario, where
a better alternative is always preferred to a weaker alternative, a ranking is easy to
develop. For example, if alternative A1 is preferred to alternatives A2 and A3, and
A2 is preferred to A3, we have a clear ranking relationship of A1 >A2 >A3.
In practical scenarios, however, there will most likely be inconsistencies and im-
perfect results. For example, in the above case we could have A3 be preferred to A1,
which introduces the need for a ranking method.
Many ranking methods use a series of pairwise comparisons between alternatives
to produce a matrix of preference relationships. The rating vector will be either a
solution to a system of linear equations or a dominant eigenvector, depending on the
ranking method. Many popular methods have experienced considerable success using
this framework. For example, the Massey [1] and Colley [2] methods are popular
sports ranking methods that use a system of linear equations to develop ratings for
teams. The Analytic Hierarchy Process [3] is a ranking method developed by Saaty
2to help users make decisions involving multiple criteria. The method takes a series of
pairwise preferences from a user to develop a dominance matrix, and then solves the
dominant eigenvector of that matrix to obtain its ratings and rankings.
Perhaps the most popular example of pairwise comparison ranking methods is
Google and their use of Markov chains to rank web pages [4]. Others have used the
theory behind this approach to represent the alternatives being ranked as nodes in
a discrete-time Markov chain, with the transition probabilities being the pairwise
comparisons [5–9]. A generalized form of this ranking method is called the Markov
method [7, 10], and was recently highlighted in the text ”Who’s No. 1? The Science
of Rating and Ranking” from Langville and Meyer. The strength of this method is
that all of the alternatives are connected in a network of comparisons, so the quality
of a victory (or preference) is weighted by the quality of the opponent.
The strength of the Markov method was the motivation behind the first study
in this document. We use the traditional Markov method in a new application in a
recruiting scenario to provide a ranking.
However, the Markov method has been to shown to be sensitive, especially in its
tail, to small changes or outliers in data [11]. For example, in sports applications,
an upset (where a weaker team beats a stronger team) can challenge the integrity
of a ranking that was developed by the Markov method. In this document, we will
propose a modification to the Markov method that will reduce the sensitivity of the
ranking vector to these upsets.
The last section of this research work is to develop a framework that can evaluate
ranking methods and their ability to be fair and comprehensive. It is important to
note that we will not consider predictive power in this section, but only the satisficing
criteria.
This dissertation is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 will provide
a literature review of the current work and relevant information regarding pairwise
comparison ranking methods, specifically ones that use Markov chains. Chapter 3 is a
case study that uses a basic form of the Markov method to develop a ranking of college
3football recruiting classes, and to compare the predictability of this method to that
of a leading existing recruiting rankings service. Chapter 4 addresses the theoretical
issue with the sensitivity of the Markov method by proposing a modification to the
basic voting scheme, and provides experimental and theoretical results that show how
to control the sensitivity while maintaining rank integrity. In Chapter 5, we develop a
framework of axioms that constitute the fairness and comprehensiveness of a ranking
method. Popular ranking methods are evaluated in their ability to adhere to the
listed axioms. Finally, Chapter 6 will discuss a summary of conclusions and future
research work beyond this dissertation.
42. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Popular Pairwise Comparison Ranking Methods
In general, many ranking methods use a matrix of pairwise comparisons to solve
either a system of linear equations or an eigenvector to obtain a rating vector, which in
turn, provides a ranking vector. Although the initial intent of many of these methods
were to rank sports teams, there are other applications, such as web search engines
or recommender systems that use similar principles.
2.1.1 Massey method
Kenneth Massey developed the Massey method in 1997 to rank college football
teams using the theory of least squares [1]. The Massey method was used by the
NCAA FBS (Football Bowl Subdivision) in calculating the BCS (Bowl Championship
Series) rankings. The BCS rankings were used from 1998-2013 to determine the two
teams that would play for the National Championship, as well as several other major
bowl games.
The concept in this ranking method is that the difference in the ratings of two
teams should equal the difference in the score of their competition. The fundamental
equation for the ranking method is written as
Mr = p (2.1)
where M is the Massey matrix, r is the unknown rating vector, and p is a vector
of cumulative point differentials. The Massey matrix is comprised of the diagonal
element Mii which is equal to the total number of games played by team i, and the
element Mij which is the negation of the number of games played between team i
and j. Because the linear system does not have a unique solution, one of the rows
5of the Massey matrix must be replaced with all ones and the corresponding entry of
the right-hand side vector with a zero. The solution to this revised system of linear
equations above will give the rating vector of the teams being ranked.
It is important to note that the point differential vector does not take into account
the scoring margins against specific teams, only the cumulative sum for each individ-
ual team. In turn, a large point differential could be obtained from defeating weaker
opponents by large amounts, which could introduce potential biases in the ranking.
2.1.2 Colley method
A similar ranking method is the Colley method, which was developed in 2002
by Wesley Colley [2]. This method also solves a system of linear equations, but has
different definitions for its matrix and its right-hand side vector. Let wi equal the
number of wins for team i, li equal the number of losses for team i, ti equal the total
number of games played by team i, and nij is the number of times teams i and j play
each other. The equation for the ranking method is written as
Cr = b (2.2)
where C is the Colley matrix, r is the unknown rating vector, and b is a vector of





2 + ti i = j
−nij i = j
(2.3)
bi = 1 +
1
2
(wi − li) (2.4)
Again, solving the system of linear equations for the unknown rating vector will
provide a ranking of the teams. A shortcoming, however, of the Colley method is
that the strength of an individual opponent is not taken into consideration, only the
total number of wins and losses.
62.1.3 Keener’s method
Next, we examine Keener’s method [12], which was developed by James Keener in
1993 to rank college football teams. The fundamental equation for Keeners method
is
Ar = λr (2.5)
where A is a matrix that satisfies the eigenvector r and the eigenvalue λ. If the
matrix A is irreducible, the Perron-Frobenius theorem guarantees the existence and
uniqueness of the ratings vector. There are various approaches to obtain the Keener
matrix, but generally, it is formed by taking the ratio of scores between two teams.




Sij + Sji + 2
) (2.6)
In general, h is a smoothing function that minimizes the effect of a team running up













The primary weakness of the Keener method is that the strength of schedule can
oftentimes be too influential, and playing many weak opponents can cause more harm
than good. Since many teams do not control their schedule, it seems counterintuitive
to penalize a team for defeating teams that they were required to play.
2.1.4 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)
Developed by Thomas Saaty, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is yet another
method that uses pairwise comparisons to populate a matrix in which the dominant
eigenvector is the rating vector [3, 13, 14]. In this sense, there are many parallels
between the AHP and Keeners method previously discussed. The AHP is a tool for
7decision makers that need to make complex, multi-criteria decisions. The AHP is not
only versatile in application, but also a widely used tool in many developing countries.
The foundation of this method is a reciprocal pairwise comparison matrix, in which
a user inputs the preference of one alternative to another. The preference value placed






Once the entire matrix is obtained, the dominant eigenvector is the rating vector.
Oftentimes in this application the user is interested in simply making a decision, so
the rating vector is not necessary, just the ranking vector.
A drawback of AHP is that it relies fully on the user’s preferences to obtain its
rating vector. This also has advantages, however, in that a personalized ranking can
be obtained for a specific user.
2.2 Popular Pairwise Comparison Ranking Methods using Markov Chains
In this section, we outline a subset of pairwise comparison rankings that use
Markov chains to produce ratings and rankings. The fundamental input is to obtain
a stochastic matrix that represents the transition probabilities between alternatives,
and then to obtain the steady-state probability vector of that matrix, which will
correspond to the desired rating vector.
The advantage to these methods is that they take the quality of each individual
opponent into consideration, meaning a victory over a strong team will help more
than a victory over a weak team. Although previous methods, such as the Massey and
Colley methods, take strength of schedule into account, they do not take individual
results into account.
82.2.1 PageRank algorithm
Perhaps the most influential ranking method of recent memory is the PageRank
algorithm developed by Sergey Brin and Lawrence Page [4]. Google uses this method
to produce ratings for web pages, and then obtain a ranking of web pages. Each web
page can be thought of as a node in a discrete finite Markov chain, and the edges are
defined by hyperlinks between the web pages. An adjacency matrix is constructed
that contains zeros and ones depending on whether or not there exists a connection
between two nodes. Several adjustments are made to the adjacency matrix to ensure
that it is stochastic, and finally the dominant eigenvector is the rating vector. It is
also acceptable to use the steady-state probability vector as the rating vector, as we
will see in later chapters. Oftentimes, when the matrix is large and difficult to solve,
one can use the Power method to obtain the steady-state probability vector.
2.2.2 Random Walker method
The Random Walker ranking method was introduced by Callaghan, Mucha, and
Porter to provide a ranking for Division I-A football teams [5]. The motivation was
to find a methodology that factored in the strength of opponents played. This is
especially important in college football where there are a dearth of games played and
many teams with vastly different schedules.
The idea behind this method is that there are a collection of automated voters
(random walkers) that declare preferences for a single team. Each voter will randomly
select a game from that teams schedule and decide whether or not to change its
preference to the opponent based on the outcome of the game. This process is repeated
and eventually there is a steady-state distribution of voters for each team, which is
equivalent to that team’s rating. In this sense, the method strongly resembles the
Markov method (which will be introduced later).
For team i, let wi equal the number of wins, let li equal the number of losses, let
Nij equal the number of games played between team i and team j, and let Aij equal
9the number of times team i beats team j minus the number of times team i loses to
j. If team i beats team j, the average rate at which an automated voter changes its
preference from team j to team i is proportional to p. The primary matrix, D, is
defined by the following equations:








Finally, the steady-state vector v satisfies the following equation:
Dv = 0 (2.11)
The vector v is the expected population of random walkers that will vote for each
team, and that information is used directly to rank teams, in that the population of
random walkers for each team is equivalent to the rating of that team.
2.2.3 Logistic regression / Markov chain method (LRMC)
The LRMC ranking method was developed by Kvam and Sokol, and is an exten-
sion of the Random Walker ranking method [6]. The primary purpose of this ranking
method was to use the information from point scores and home court advantages to
rank teams in NCAA Division I men’s college basketball.
What separates this method from other methods that use Markov chains is that it
uses logistic regression to estimate the transition probabilities. However, once those
values are obtained, the remainder of the method is to simply calculate the stationary
(steady-state) vector which will be equivalent to the rating vector. This method was
very successful at predicting team performance in the NCAA tournament, especially
in comparison to some of the competing ranking methods.
2.2.4 Park-Newman method
In 2005, the Park-Newman ranking method was developed to rank college football
teams [9]. This is another ranking method that indirectly uses the concept of Markov
10
chains to rank its alternatives. The main difference with this method is that it takes
indirect wins into account. An indirect win is when team i defeats team j, and team
j defeats team k, we say that team i had an indirect win of degree 2 over team k.
Indirect wins of higher dimension are also considered but have less impact as the
degree increases. A major task when using this method is to develop a value for the
parameter that will determine the magnitude of the impact of indirect wins.
2.2.5 Markov method
Last, we examine the general form of the Markov method [7, 10], which was used
by Govan in 2008 to rank sports teams, and was recently highlighted by Langville
and Meyer in their text, ”Who’s No. 1? The Science of Rating and Ranking.” The
Markov method can be thought of a pairwise comparison ranking method that uses
Markov chains to rate and rank its alternatives.
The main concept of the method is that each individual competition between
two alternatives (or teams) results in the losing alternative voting for the winning
alternative. These collection of votes will populate a square matrix that represents
the head-to-head competitions between all of the alternatives. There are many ways to
construct this voting matrix. For example, a voting matrix could contain information
on just wins and losses, and another voting matrix could contain information score
differentials. In this document, we will use the basic form of voting for wins and
losses, and will refer to this as the (0, 1) voting scheme.
Next, we transform the voting matrix into a stochastic matrix. The stochastic
matrix will ultimately provide the steady-state probability vector and thus, the rating
vector.
We now introduce an example of the Markov method. Say that we are given four




Win-Loss Records, Markov method example
Win-Loss Records A B C D
A - 3-2 4-1 4-1
B 2-3 - 2-3 5-0
C 1-4 3-2 - 3-2
D 1-4 0-5 2-3 -
Next, we develop the voting matrix. Each time an alternative loses to another
alternative, they will place a vote for that alternative in the matrix. The voting




0 2 1 1
3 0 3 0
4 2 0 2
4 5 3 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
We then normalize the rows of the voting matrix to develop a stochastic transition






























Finally, we solve for either the dominant eigenvector of this matrix, or use the Power
method to obtain the steady-state probability vector. Both approaches will yield the
following ratings and rankings:
The major advantage of the Markov method is that takes the quality of the victory
into account, meaning a victory over a stronger opponent will be valued higher than
a victory over a weaker opponent. In Chapter 3, we will introduce a new application
for the Markov method to solve a traditional recruiting problem, and compare the
results to a leading ranking service in terms of their predictive ability.
12
Table 2.2






A major drawback of the Markov method, however, is that it is sensitive to small
changes in data, especially in its tail, and can exhibit faulty behavior under these
circumstances [11]. Intuitively, one can think of an upset in sports as a small change
in data, and the Markov method has been shown to perform poorly under these
conditions. In Chapter 4, we aim to address the issue of sensitivity to erratic data by




In general, for a set of n alternatives, the rank of an alternative is its relative
importance to the other alternatives in the set. Often, a ranking method will first
produce ratings of the alternatives. Next, sorting the alternatives in order of decreas-
ing ratings will provide a ranking.
Many ranking algorithms use pairwise comparisons between the alternatives to
determine ratings and rankings. Kendall and Smith [15] introduced the Method
of Paired Comparisons, which developed rankings of alternatives based on a set of
pairwise preferences between alternatives. Arpad Elo’s Rating System [16] is another
example of a rating method that uses the results of head-to-head competitive matches
to provide ratings, and has been used primarily in the rating of chess players. The
Analytic Hierarchy Process [3] is a popular ranking method that uses pairwise compar-
isons to populate a reciprocal dominance matrix, in which the dominant eigenvector
of the matrix is the rating of the alternatives.
In addition to using pairwise comparisons, some ranking methods use Markov
chains [17] to develop ratings. Google uses the PageRank method [4] to rank its web-
pages when returning search results, which contains a series of pairwise comparisons
embedded in its algorithm. There also exist methods that use pairwise competitive
matches to estimate conditional probabilities [5, 6] that ultimately provide ratings.
There is also the Markov method [7] that directly uses Markov chains to rate its
alternatives by connecting them through a voting process based on pairwise results.
The Crowd-Ranking method is an extension of the Markov method. It uses the
basic theory of the method as the foundation of the ranking algorithm. The basic idea
of the Markov method can be described by voting, in that the weaker alternative will
14
place a vote for the stronger alternative. These votes populate a dominance matrix in
which the steady-state probability vector is the rating of the alternatives. There are
many ways to determine the voting scheme for the method. In Crowd-Ranking, we
use a simple approach in that the losing alternative places one vote for the winning
alternative.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 will provide the
problem definition regarding the ranking method. Section 3 will define the ranking
method and algorithm. Next, in Section 4, a perfect-case scenario is observed to
validate the theoretical basis of the ranking method. Section 5 will provide a case
study application of Crowd-Ranking to Big Ten football recruiting from 2002− 2013,
and compare its predictability to a leading recruiting ranking service, Rivals. Last,
Section 6 provides a conclusion and discussion points.
3.2 Problem Definition
This study is to focus on a specific scenario, in which a set of groups are recruiting
a set of individuals to join the groups. The main objective is to rank the groups in
order of the quality of individuals that they ultimately obtain. This problem can be
thought of as a typical recruiting process, where groups recruit individuals to join
them. The scenario is defined below:
1. There are n groups, {G1,G2,. . . ,Gn}, that extend offers to a set ofm individuals,
{I1,I2,. . . ,Im}.
2. An individual group can extend offers up to the entire set of individuals. Each
individual, however, may only select one group to join.
There are several cases in application where the above scenario holds true. For
example, a university can be defined as a group that extends admittance to a set of in-
dividual students, and the students can only select one university to attend. Another
example is to consider a company (group) that extends job offers to a set of individual
prospective employees (individuals), and the prospective employees may only select
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one job offer. Last, consider the case of collegiate athletic recruiting, specifically, in
NCAA football. The college football teams (groups) will extend scholarship offers to
a set of individual recruits (individuals), and the recruits may only select one team
from the set of offers.
It is important to note that we are ranking one specific crop of individuals for
each group, so we won’t necessarily have a comprehensive ranking of the groups as a
whole. This is because a group is comprised of several crops of individuals over time.
However, we could use these individual rankings to feed into an encompassing ranking.
For example, in college football, the set of five recruiting classes that comprise a team
could be combined to obtain one final team ranking (as will be seen in Section 5 when
measuring predictability).
3.3 Methodology
The Crowd-Ranking method relies on a dual-level decision process between two
parties: the groups and the individuals. The groups are the entities being ranked,
and must decide on the set of individuals that will receive an offer. The individuals
are a large set of decision-makers that select a group based on their available offers.
The fundamental input of the ranking algorithm relies on two forms of data:
• An individual’s set of offers.
• An individual’s selection of a group from its set of offers.
Once the data is obtained, the first step in the ranking algorithm is to develop the
voting matrix. When an individual selects a group, which is said to be the ”winning”
group, the remaining groups that offered the individual and were not selected are said
to be the ”defeated” groups. The set of defeated groups will place a ”vote” for the
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winning group, and this will be done for the set of all individuals. The voting matrix,




0 v12 v13 . . . v1n
v21 0 v23 . . . v2n






vn1 vn2 vn3 . . . 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
In the voting matrix, vij is the total number of votes from Gi to Gj. Each matrix entry
indicates the total number of preferences from individuals regarding the groups. For
example, the entry v32 = 7 indicates that there were seven individuals that selected
group G2 that had offers from group G3. In turn, the entries of the voting matrix can
be thought of as a series of pairwise comparisons that display the relative dominance
among the groups.
One can also think of the voting matrix as a collection of wins and losses in terms
of individuals between all of the groups in their respective contests, with a contest
being a head-to-head matchup between two groups that offered an individual, and
the winner of the matchup being the selected group. There is always one winner per
individual, the selected group, and there can be any number of losers, depending on
how many offers were received by that individual. Notice that a strong individual with
many offers will have a larger impact on the rankings than an individual with only a
few offers. Also, the quality of the offers are important, meaning offers from groups
with higher rankings will carry more weight than from groups with lower rankings.
Based on the voting matrix, we can use the principles from the Markov method
to rank the relative dominance of the groups [7, 10]. The Markov method assumes
that the voting matrix can be represented as a Markov chain. If a random walk is
taken along the Markov graph, the long-run proportion of time spent at each group
will be the rating of that groups strength.
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The next step is to normalize the rows of the voting matrix in order to obtain a




0 p12 p13 . . . p1n
p21 0 p23 . . . p2n






pn1 pn2 pn3 . . . 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Each matrix entry indicates the probability that the group will vote for the respective
group. For example, the entry p32 = 0.25 indicates that group G3 will vote for G2
25% of the time.
The P matrix is now a transition probability matrix from a Markov chain. We
can then find the dominant eigenvector of the matrix, which is equivalent to the
steady-state probability vector of the matrix. A necessary condition to obtain this
steady-state probability vector is to have an ergodic Markov chain. This steady-state
probability value for each group becomes a rating of the relative dominance of that
group. There exist other ranking methods, which use the dominant eigenvector of
a non-negative matrix to develop a ranking [12, 14]. A matrix that gives pairwise
dominances of its alternatives will yield an eigenvector solution that displays the
relative dominance among its alternatives.
A critical element of this model is that the groups possess a collective wisdom on
the quality of individuals that they are offering. In turn, the quality of an individual
is weighted by the quality of its offers. For example, if a group obtains an individual
with offers from other groups with high ratings, it will gain votes from each of those
groups. Because those top groups will now give higher transition probabilities to the
winning group, the steady-state probability value and thus rating for that group will
increase. There have been recent studies, for example, Herm, Callsen-Bracker, and
Kreis [18], which have shown the value of using crowds to predict in sports.
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3.4 Perfect Season
To validate the ranking method, a perfect season scenario will be introduced and
reviewed. The purpose of this is to show that the ranking method is performing and
providing results as expected. This is similar to the approach from Chartier et al. [11]
when reviewing the sensitivity and stability of various ranking methods.
In defining a perfect season, it is assumed that there is a specific ordering of both
the groups and individuals, and the best groups offer and obtain the best individuals.
An intuitive explanation of a perfect season is to have a series of matches with no
”upsets,” where an upset is defined as a weaker group defeating a stronger group in
a match.
To start, assume the following preference relationships hold true for the set of all
groups and individuals:
Gi > Gi+1, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} (3.1)
Ii > Ii+1, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1} (3.2)
In this example, for simplicity, say that both the number of groups and individuals
are equal to five, and that the following set of offers and selections were made based
on the above preference relationships. An offer is indicated by a lower-case ”x” and
the selection of an offer is indicated by a capital and bold ”Y.”
Table 3.1
Offers and selections for perfect season
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5
I1 Y x x x x
I2 Y x x x




As discussed, there are no upsets in the perfect season. Group 1 defeated all of
the other groups for the best individual, Group 2 defeated the lower three groups for
the 2nd best individual, and so on. The next step in the algorithm is to compile the





0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
There is an issue with the voting matrix in that an undefeated group creates an
absorbing state, because there were no losses and hence no votes. If you were to
normalize the rows of the voting matrix, the first row would still contain all zeroes.
A popular strategy for handling an undefeated group is obtained from the PageRank
method and its ”dangling node” adjustment [19]. This is also the strategy used by
Chartier et al. [11] when observing the Markov method for a perfect season. The
adjustment is to add a value of 1
n
to the row in the transitional probability matrix of
the absorbing state. Thus, the resulting matrix will be stochastic and can be solved
to obtain a steady-state probability vector. Intuitively, think of this step as restarting








































To solve the steady-state probability vector, it is acceptable to either calculate the
dominant eigenvector or use the Power Method as discussed previously. The resulting
















The ratings produce a coherent ranking of the five groups to what was expected from
the initially assumed preferences. Generally, for n groups, the rating for a perfect
season with the Markov method is given as follows [11], where H(n) is the nth partial
















In turn, for a perfect season, it can be seen that the Crowd-Ranking method produces
a correct ranking in terms of the initial preference relationships for all of the groups.
However, it should be noted that the Crowd-Ranking method is an extension of the
Markov method, and that the Markov method can be extremely sensitive to upsets,
especially in its tail [11].
3.5 Application of Crowd-Ranking to NCAA Football Recruiting
To demonstrate the Crowd-Ranking method in a case study application, it was
applied to NCAA football recruiting in the Big Ten (B1G) Conference of the FBS
(Football Bowl Subdivision). In this study, the groups were Big Ten football teams’
recruiting classes (excluding Nebraska, since they recently joined the Big Ten in 2011),
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and the individuals were the prospective football recruits. The data for scholarship
offers and team selection were available online through Rivals (www.rivals.com), a
subscription-based online recruiting website. The data from 2002 − 2013 were used
in this study.
The Rivals website provides the data in its individual player pages of all of the
teams that have offered a football scholarship to that particular recruit. The recruit
will select one team by the end of the recruiting process. The selected team will
receive votes from all other teams that extended this recruit a scholarship offer. As
explained in previously, each individual recruit can consist of up to n− 1 competitive
matches among the teams. Table 3.2 is an example of the voting matrix for Big Ten
teams during the 2012 recruiting season. Each matrix entry indicates a vote from
Table 3.2
Voting matrix, B1G teams, 2012
ILL IND IA UM MSU MN NU OSU PSU PU WI
ILL 0 5 6 16 8 4 4 6 4 5 4
IND 3 0 7 10 5 1 5 9 0 4 4
IA 3 1 0 10 4 3 4 6 5 1 4
UM 0 0 2 0 2 1 3 11 1 1 4
MSU 0 1 2 14 0 2 1 10 1 1 4
MN 2 3 5 3 3 0 1 7 0 2 3
NU 1 1 3 3 2 0 0 3 2 2 2
OSU 0 0 1 6 2 2 1 0 0 0 1
PSU 0 0 1 6 1 0 0 7 0 1 0
PU 0 3 4 4 5 0 1 8 0 0 1
WI 3 0 4 5 4 1 0 5 1 1 0
one team to another. For example, the entry (ILL, MSU) = 8 means that there were
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8 recruits that selected MSU (Michigan State) that had scholarship offers from ILL
(Illinois). Notice that the voting matrix is not a symmetrical matrix.
The next step is to normalize the rows of the voting matrix so that the sum of
each row in the voting matrix is equal to a value of one. Table 3.3 is an example
of the row-normalized matrix for Big Ten teams during the 2012 recruiting season.
The values in Table 3 are the probabilities that each team will vote for the other
Table 3.3
Transition probability matrix, B1G teams, 2012
ILL IN IA UM MSU MN NU OSU PSU PU WI
ILL 0 0.08 0.10 0.26 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.07
IN 0.06 0 0.15 0.21 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.19 0 0.08 0.08
IA 0.07 0.02 0 0.24 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.10
UM 0 0 0.08 0 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.44 0.04 0.04 0.16
MSU 0 0.03 0.06 0.39 0 0.06 0.03 0.28 0.03 0.03 0.11
MN 0.07 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.10 0 0.03 0.24 0 0.07 0.10
NU 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.11 0 0 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.11
OSU 0 0 0.08 0.46 0.15 0.15 0.08 0 0 0 0.08
PSU 0 0 0.06 0.38 0.06 0 0 0.44 0 0.06 0
PU 0 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.19 0 0.04 0.31 0 0 0.04
WI 0.13 0 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.04 0 0.21 0.04 0.04 0
teams. For example, the entry (ILL, MSU) = 0.129 means that ILL will vote for
MSU 12.9% of the time. The above row-normalized matrix is now analogous to the
one-step transition probability matrix for a Markov chain, and can be used to obtain
the rating vector of the teams. Table 3.4 is the steady-state probability vector and
resulting ranking for the 2012 Big Ten recruiting classes.
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Table 3.4













3.5.1 Comparison of Crowd-Ranking to Rivals
The Crowd-Ranking method will now be compared to Rivals, which is a leading
provider of recruiting news, information, and rankings for NCAA football. To cal-
culate rankings, Rivals first calculates the total points each team obtains from its
recruiting class. The total points for a recruiting class is the summation of the in-
dividual points for the top 20 recruits. Rivals has a team of analysts that assign a
point value to each recruit. Table 3.5 shows a comparison of the two methods in 2012.
The ratings for the Rivals method have been normalized out of 100 total points for
comparison.
It can be seen that both ranking methods perform similar to one another not
only in rankings, but in the distribution of ratings. Table 3.6 shows the difference in
ranking for each team between these two methods in 2012.
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Table 3.5
Rivals vs. Crowd-Ranking, 2012
Rivals Crowd-Ranking
Rank Team Rating Rank Team Rating
1 OSU 23.14 1 UM 23.44
2 UM 20.71 2 OSU 22.46
3 PU 9.76 3 MSU 10.62
4 MSU 8.51 4 WI 9.39
5 IA 8.28 5 IA 9.22
6 PSU 6.88 6 NU 6.49
7 WI 5.70 7 MN 6.27
8 NU 5.10 8 PSU 3.61
9 ILL 4.46 9 PU 3.59
10 IND 4.23 10 ILL 2.76
11 MN 3.23 11 IND 2.15
Notice that there were a few teams with significant differences in rankings. For
example, in 2012, the Rivals method ranked Purdue (PU) 3rd and Wisconsin (WI)
7th, while the Crowd-Ranking method ranked Wisconsin 4th and Purdue 9th. The
reason behind the difference is that in 2012 Purdue had 26 recruits and Wisconsin
had only 12 recruits. This illustrates that although Purdue had a large number of
recruits, they werent recruits that were offered by other Big Ten teams. Wisconsin,
on the other hand, had a smaller number of recruits in 2012, but the recruits were
offered by many other higher ranked Big Ten teams. Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 show
the rankings of B1G teams from 2002− 2013 by both methods.
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3.5.2 Predictive power of Crowd-Ranking and Rivals
In this section, we examine the predictive power of the two ranking methods. Since
the Big Ten conference does not issue its own set of rankings, we will examine the
results of all Big Ten games (excluding Nebraska from 2011−2013) from 2006−2013,
and compare Crowd-Ranking to Rivals in their ability to accurately pick the winner.
Also, we will look at the Big Ten champion(s) each year, and see which ranking
method had the team(s) ranked higher.
First, we need to establish a composite ranking for each team in each season. Since
college football players can remain on their team for up to five years, we used the sum
of the previous five recruiting class rankings to obtain a composite team ranking. For
example, in 2009, the composite ranking for Illinois will be the sum of their recruiting




Rivals B1G recruiting class rankings, 2002− 2013
Team ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13
ILL 6 2 8 8 4 3 4 5 8 7 9 6
IND 11 8 10 11 11 11 11 9 11 9 10 3
IA 8 7 7 2 6 5 8 10 5 3 5 8
UM 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
MSU 4 9 2 7 5 7 7 3 4 4 4 4
MN 9 4 9 10 9 9 3 6 6 8 11 11
NU 10 10 11 9 10 8 10 8 9 10 8 7
OSU 1 6 3 3 2 2 1 1 3 1 1 1
PSU 3 11 4 4 1 4 6 4 1 5 6 5
PU 5 3 5 5 8 10 9 11 7 11 3 9
WI 7 5 6 6 7 6 5 7 10 6 7 10
The first metric we will examine is the total number of games accurately predicted
by each ranking method. Next, we will see how many games that Crowd-Ranking
predicted correctly and Rivals predicted did not predict correctly, and how many
games that Rivals predicted correctly and Crowd-Ranking did not predict correctly.
This is important because many of the games will involve both ranking methods
predicting either correctly or incorrectly, but we are concerned with when one method
out-performs the other method. This approach is similar to Kvam and Sokol [6]
when comparing the predictability of several ranking methods. Also, when a ranking
method has the same ranking for both teams (the event of a tie), we will not consider
this to be a correct prediction.
Table 3.9 shows the results for the Rivals and Crowd-Ranking (CR) methods for
all Big Ten games played from 2006− 2013.
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Table 3.8
Crowd-Ranking B1G recruiting class rankings, 2002− 2013
Team ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13
ILL 3 4 7 9 8 5 1 5 9 7 10 6
IND 11 11 9 11 11 11 11 9 11 8 11 7
IA 7 8 8 2 4 2 8 8 4 4 5 9
UM 1 1 2 5 3 6 3 2 1 6 1 1
MSU 5 5 4 6 5 7 7 4 5 3 3 3
MN 10 10 11 7 9 10 5 7 8 10 7 11
NU 9 9 10 10 10 9 9 10 10 11 6 8
OSU 2 3 1 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2
PSU 4 6 3 8 1 4 4 3 3 5 8 4
PU 8 2 5 1 7 8 10 11 6 9 9 10
WI 6 7 6 4 6 3 6 6 7 2 4 5
Crowd-Ranking was more successful at predicting the winner over the eight sea-
sons, and had significantly more cases in which it predicted the correct winner and
Rivals did not. Also, there was not a single season in which the Rivals method
predicted more correct games than the Crowd-Ranking method.
Next, we look at the one-tailed significance results when comparing Crowd-Ranking
to Rivals. A one-tailed version of McNemars test was used, similar to the approach by
Kvam and Sokol [6]. This test is used because we are concerned with the differences in
the ranking methods, not necessarily when both accurately predict a winner, or when
both do not predict the winner. Using McNemars test, we find a Chi-squared value
equal to 6.62 and a p-value equal to 0.005, indicating that Crowd-Ranking performed
significantly better than Rivals.
Table 3.10 shows the Big Ten champions from 2006-2013, and the rankings given
to those teams by both methods. Notice that the Crowd-Ranking method ranked the
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Table 3.9
Crowd-Ranking vs. Rivals in B1G games, 2006− 2013
Year Rivals CR Rivals >CR CR >Rivals Total Games
2006 29 32 0 3 44
2007 30 32 2 4 44
2008 27 27 2 2 44
2009 24 27 1 4 44
2010 26 27 2 3 44
2011 26 27 2 3 41
2012 28 30 0 2 40
2013 28 32 0 4 41
Total 218 234 9 25 342
Table 3.10
Crowd-Ranking vs. Rivals to predict champion, 2006− 2013
Year Big Ten Champs Rivals Ranking CR Ranking
2006 OSU 2 1
2007 OSU 2 1
2008 OSU, PSU 2, 3 1, 3
2009 OSU 1 1
2010 OSU, MSU, WI 1, 5, 8 1, 5, 5
2011 Wisc. 8 4
2012 Wisc. 8 5
2013 MSU 3 3
Big Ten champion higher in four out of the eight season. In two seasons, both methods
ranked the eventual champion equally. In 2008 and 2010, where there were conference
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co-champions, both methods ranked some of the teams equally, but Crowd-Ranking
ranked the remaining co-champion higher than Rivals.
3.5.3 Potential data biases
In this study, the accuracy of the reported scholarship offers of a specific recruit
is a primary input of the model. In turn, the results of the comparison above rely on
the quality of data posted on the Rivals website regarding scholarship offers received
by the recruits.
Also, occasionally a high-quality player accepts an offer early in the recruitment
process. In this case, the player may not receive additional offers. This is not to
say the player was not coveted by other teams, but just that the recruitment process
ended before they could obtain more offers.
Last, teams that recruit nationally and out of the Big Ten region will be subject to
bias because not as many Big Ten teams will recruit those players. For example, since
Penn State is on the eastern footprint of the region, they will recruit heavily along
the east coast and often against Big East and ACC schools. Some quality players
from that region might not receive Big Ten offers due to their proximity from the
conference footprint, and in turn, Penn State will not receive as many votes.
3.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, a new approach, the Crowd-Ranking method, was proposed for a
special recruiting problem. The method reflects the decisions of two stakeholders, the
groups and the individuals. This Markov-based method considers both quantity and
quality when producing a ranking.
Based on our application in Big Ten football recruiting, the Crowd-Ranking
method performed better than Rivals, one of the popular ranking methods, in both
predicting future performance in Big Ten football games, and predicting the even-
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tual Big Ten champion(s). The ranking method can be used in any application of a
recruiting problem.
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4. SENSITIVITY OF THE MARKOV METHOD
4.1 Introduction
The objective of a ranking is to develop an ordered list of a set of alternatives
based on their relative importance. A class of ranking methods use paired compar-
isons between the alternatives to produce ratings and rankings. These paired com-
parison ranking methods are heavily examined due to their widespread applications,
spanning from sports teams [12], to chess players [16], to web search engines [4], to
even movie recommendations [20]. The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is a pop-
ular paired comparison ranking method [3] with many applications for multicriteria
decision making, such as ranking decision making units [21]. There is also interest
in understanding the underlying mechanics of ranking methods, as seen by Chartier
and Peachey [22] and their approach to reverse engineer the annual college rankings
of the U.S. News and World Report.
Of the pairwise comparison ranking methods, there are several methods that use
Markov chains to rank a set of alternatives [7–9, 17]. Google is a recent example
of having experienced significant success with using the theory of Markov chains to
rank webpages [4]. Some methods use intricate mathematics to obtain the transition
probabilities that will populate the transition matrix [5,6]. Kyriacos et al. [23] found
that there is additional information regarding preference relationships when using
Markov chains to rank alternatives.
The Markov method [7] is a popular ranking method that uses a series of pairwise
comparisons to develop its rating and ranking vector. Many recent applications use
the principles of the method, and it was recently highlighted by Langville and Meyer
[10] in ”Who’s No. 1?: The Science of Rating and Ranking.”
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Recently, however, it has been shown that the Markov method has a sensitive
ranking vector [11]. Although it can be difficult to evaluate the quality of a ranking,
a poor ranking can be defined as one that is not robust and displays extreme sensitivity
to small changes in data.
There are other studies that investigate the sensitivity of a ranking method. Bu-
rer [24] found that the Colley method [2] can be sensitive under special conditions
when ranking college football teams. Ramanathan and Ramanathan [25] investigated
the sensitivity of an extension of the AHP method and whether or not it possesses
desirable rank reversal properties. Zahir [26] studied if acceptable rank reversal prop-
erties exist in the presence of imperfect human behavior.
In 2011, Chartier et al. conducted a study on the sensitivity and stability of
various ranking vectors. In this study, they reviewed three popular methods: the
Massey method [1], the Colley method [2], and the Markov method [7]. To determine
the sensitivity of the methods, the authors used an input rating vector to build a
perfect season in which a higher rated alternative defeated a lower rated alternative
in each competition. Next, they examined the sensitivity of the ranking method by
inflicting a small perturbation to the system. Intuitively, this was the sensitivity
of a given ranking method to upsets (cases of a lower-rated alternative defeating a
higher-rated alternative). It was found that the Massey and Colley methods generally
exhibited insensitivity to upsets. The Markov method, on the other hand, displayed
sensitivity to upsets, particularly in its tail. In turn, the Massey and Colley methods
were more robust to upset events than the Markov method.
An upset can have similar effects outside of just sports ranking applications. For
example, recommender systems use ranking methods to provide an ordered list of
suggestions for its users. The primary inputs for theses ranking methods rely on past
user behavior. A rare or one-time search topic by the user is seen as an upset event,
and may cause unpredictable ranking behavior. Thus, insensitive ranking methods
are essential for providing robust recommender systems.
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The purpose of this study is to propose a modification to the voting scheme of the
Markov method that will yield a more robust ranking. The two major issues with the
current scheme are 1) the potential of a periodic Markov chain, and 2) the sensitivity
of the ranking vector. We will show that the modified voting scheme produces both
1) an aperiodic Markov chain, and 2) a ranking vector with less sensitivity to upsets,
particularly in its tail.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 will introduce
the Markov method in its voting scheme, as described by Langville and Meyer [10],
compared to a proposed modified voting scheme. Section 3 will show an example
of the current voting scheme producing a periodic Markov chain, while the modified
voting scheme is seen to always obtain a Markov chain that is aperiodic. In Section
4, we introduce an example of a perfect season, and compare both voting schemes
and how they perform when an upset occurs. Last, in Section 5, we generalize the
sensitivity of the two methods by observing the tailing effect of the ratings as the
number of alternatives increases.
4.2 The Markov Method
The Markov method can be viewed as a voting process, where each competition
allows a weaker alternative to ”vote” for a stronger alternative. A collection of votes
populates a voting matrix that is the fundamental input of the ranking vector. Next,
the rows of the voting matrix are normalized, making it a stochastic matrix. The
stochastic matrix can be thought of as a transitional probability matrix of a Markov
chain, and the steady-state probability vector of that matrix is the rating vector of the
alternatives. The scope of our modification is the compilation of the voting matrix,
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and all steps in the Markov method following the development of the voting matrix




0 v12 v13 . . . v1n
v21 0 v23 . . . v2n






vn1 vn2 vn3 . . . 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
In the voting matrix, V , vij is the total number of votes from Gi to Gj.
4.2.1 Voting schemes
In its current form [10], the voting scheme is simple, in that the losing alternative
will place a vote of value 1 to the winning alternative. In the case where Aj defeats Ai
in a competition, vij will increase by a value of 1, indicating that the ith alternative
voted for the jth alternative. Notice that vji remains unchanged, indicating that the
jth alternative did not vote for the ith alternative. For the remainder of this paper,
we will refer to this as the (0,1) voting scheme.
In this paper, we will introduce a new voting scheme, which we will refer to as
the (1,α) voting scheme. In this scheme, both alternatives will vote for each other
following a competition. In the case where Aj defeats Ai in a competition, vij will
increase by a designated constant value of α > 1. However, the winning alternative
will also vote for the losing alternative, meaning that vji will increase by a value of 1.
4.3 Periodicity of the Markov Method
When developing a ranking of multiple alternatives, it is important that the rank
reflects the order of all n alternatives, not just a subset. For example, a ranking that
identifies the best alternative, but gives no information regarding the remaining n1
alternatives is not a complete ranking.
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In this section, we show that when using the (0,1) voting scheme, if the associated
Markov chain is periodic, it is possible to obtain an incomplete ranking. However,
when using the (1,α) voting scheme, all associated Markov chains will be aperiodic
and will give a complete ranking. A chain is said to aperiodic if it has at least one
state that can return to itself at an irregular rate.
Consider an example where the number of alternatives n = 5. We assume a round
robin tournament in which each alternative will have two competitions with each
other alternative. Last, assume that alternative Ai defeats alternative Ai+1 in every
competition, except for when A1 competes with A2, which results in a split (one win
and one loss for both). The tournament would result in the following standings: We
Table 4.1
Win-Loss record for round robin tournament
Rank Alternative Win-Loss Record Win Pct.
T-1st A1 7− 1 0.875
T-1st A2 7− 1 0.875
3rd A3 4− 4 0.50
4th A4 2− 6 0.25
5th A5 0− 8 0.00
see that although the first two alternatives are tied for first, the remaining alternatives
have a clear ordering: A3 > A4 > A5.
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4.3.1 Periodicity of (0,1) voting scheme
We will now use the Markov method to develop a ranking for the above scenario.




0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
2 2 0 0 0
2 2 2 0 0
2 2 2 2 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Next, we transform the voting matrix into a transition probability matrix, P , by




0 1 0 0 0
























Last, we use the matrix P to obtain the steady-state probability vector, which is













One can see from the matrix P that the Markov chain is periodic between the
first two states. This is an issue because the steady-state probability vector will have
a value of zero for the states 3, 4, and 5. Although the desired relationship is that
A3 > A4 > A5, our rating vector gives us the relationship that A3 = A4 = A5.
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4.3.2 Periodicity of (1,α) voting scheme
We will now use the (1,α) scheme for the Markov method to develop a ranking





0 α + 1 2 2 2
α + 1 0 2 2 2
2α 2α 0 2 2
2α 2α 2α 0 2
2α 2α 2α 2α 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Next, we transform the voting matrix into a transition probability matrix, P , by















































Immediately, we can see by inspection that this is not a periodic Markov chain. In
fact, since the (1,α) method can have zero entries only in the diagonal, it is not
possible to obtain a periodic Markov chain from that voting scheme. In other words,
it will always be possible to travel back to a given state in an irregular pattern. To
fully complete the example, we will solve the above matrix for say, α = 3. Plugging
















































Last, we use the matrix P to obtain the steady-state probability vector, which is











This rating vector is an accurate representation of the dominance relationship among
the alternatives. Unlike the (0,1) voting scheme that did not differentiate between
the last three alternatives, the (1,α) voting scheme gives the desired relationship
A3 > A4 > A5.
4.4 Perfect Season
To compare the sensitivity of the (0,1) voting scheme to the (1,α) voting scheme,
we will employ the use of a perfect season scenario, similar to the approach of Chartier
et al. [11]. In their case, a perfect season was a round robin tournament in which
each alternative had one competition, with the stronger alternative winning each
competition. However, we will employ a slight modification for this section, in that
a perfect season will be defined as a scenario where all of the alternatives have two
competitions between each other, and the stronger alternative wins each individual
competition. In other words, there are no upsets that occur (later, we will measure
the sensitivity of the schemes by inserting upsets into the season). In the next section,
when we generalize the sensitivity findings, we will employ the perfect season used by
Chartier et al., in which there is only one competition between each set of alternatives.
In our example, we set the number of alternatives n = 5 and assume the following
relationship regarding the strength of the alternatives:
Ai > Ai+1, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} (4.1)
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Since we assume that no upsets occur, the relationship dictates that the weaker
alternative will be defeated by the stronger alternative in each competition.
Given a perfect season for n = 5 alternatives, Table 4.2 shows the results of the
season in terms of wins and losses.
Table 4.2
Win-Loss record for perfect season
Rank Alternative Win-Loss Record Win Pct.
1st A1 8− 0 1.00
2nd A2 6− 2 0.75
3rd A3 4− 4 0.50
4th A4 2− 6 0.25
5th A5 0− 8 0.00
4.4.1 (0,1) voting scheme
To use the Markov method to rank the alternatives, we begin by obtaining the




0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
2 2 0 0 0
2 2 2 0 0
2 2 2 2 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Since the perfect season contains an undefeated alternative, there will be no outgo-
ing votes from that alternatives state, leaving a sub-stochastic transition probability
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matrix. A strategy used by many [19] to resolve this issue is to replace the row of























































The rating vector is consistent with the original ranking of the alternatives in terms
of wins and losses. Generally, for a perfect season of n alternatives, the (0,1) voting
scheme of the Markov method will yield the following rating vector, where H(n) is
















Although the ranking is consistent and correct, the ratings can become very small as
n becomes large, especially in its tail. Later, we will see how this effects the sensitivity
of this voting scheme.
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4.4.2 (0,1) voting scheme with an upset
Assume that there was an upset in the perfect season. To illustrate an extreme
case, assume that the worst alternative, A5, defeated the best alternative, A1, in one
of their two meetings. The resulting rankings in terms of wins and losses would not
change, and the ratings only slightly change. Next, we examine how this upset effects
Table 4.3
Win-Loss record for perfect season with upset
Rank Alternative Win-Loss Record Win Pct.
1st A1 7− 1 0.875
2nd A2 6− 2 0.75
3rd A3 4− 4 0.50
4th A4 2− 6 0.25
5th A5 1− 7 0.125

















We notice from Table 4.4 that A5 has jumped from last place to a tie for first place
with A1. Using the Markov method, our ranking would be significantly different than
just looking at the wins and losses of the alternatives. Although simply looking at
the Win-Loss record does not take into account the quality of a victory, it seems
counterintuitive to rank A5 better than A2, considering that A2 had significantly
more wins and beat A5 in both of their competitions.
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Table 4.4
Markov method (MM) rating for perfect season with upset
Rank Alternative Win-Loss Record Rating
T-1st A1 7− 1 0.309
T-1st A5 1− 7 0.309
3rd A2 6− 2 0.176
4th A3 4− 4 0.118
5th A4 2− 6 0.088
Nonetheless, adding a single upset to the season changed the ratings for all of the
alternatives, and changed the rankings for all of the alternatives. Thus, the sensitivity
of the Markov method with a (0,1) voting scheme can be seen in this example. Later
in this chapter, we will show mathematically why the voting scheme is sensitive and
can exhibit irrational behavior when upsets occur.
4.4.3 (1,α) voting scheme
We will now use the modified (1,α) method to rank the alternatives. In this











Similar to the (0,1) voting scheme, the (1,α) voting scheme produces a correct ranking
for the perfect season. Notice that although the range of ratings is smaller, the ranking
is identical to the ranking obtained from the (0,1) voting scheme, as well as the ranking
obtained from observing only wins and losses.
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The value of α will affect the ratings, but not the ranking for a perfect season,
as seen in Table 4.5. One can see, however, that as α increases, the rating vector
increases its range of values. This should be expected because the reward for winning
a competition increases as α increases. In fact, as α becomes substantially large, the
Table 4.5
(1,α) method rankings for perfect season
α =
2 3 4 5 10 20 50 1000
π1 0.244 0.271 0.289 0.302 0.335 0.357 0.372 0.383
π2 0.218 0.226 0.230 0.232 0.237 0.239 0.240 0.240
π3 0.196 0.192 0.188 0.184 0.175 0.169 0.164 0.160
π4 0.178 0.166 0.158 0.152 0.139 0.130 0.124 0.120
π5 0.163 0.146 0.136 0.129 0.114 0.106 0.100 0.096
rating vector will begin to approach a similar distribution as the rating vector for the
(0,1) voting scheme.
4.4.4 (1,α) voting scheme with an upset
As we did previously, we now introduce an extreme case upset in the perfect
season, in which the worst alternative, A5, defeated the best alternative, A1 in one of
their two meetings.
First, lets see how this upset effects the (1,α) scheme of the Markov method and












From Table 4.6, we notice that A5 has only jumped up one place in this case, as
opposed to jumping up to a tie for first place with A1 in the (0,1) voting scheme.
With the (1,α) voting scheme, our ranking is relatively similar to looking at the wins
and losses of the alternatives. Also, notice that the ratings of the alternatives have
not changed significantly in this case based on a single upset.
Table 4.6
(1,α) method rating for perfect season with upset
Rank Alternative Win-Loss Record Rating
1st A1 7− 1 0.237
2nd A2 6− 2 0.215
3rd A3 4− 4 0.193
4th A5 1− 7 0.179
5th A4 2− 6 0.176
In general, if we were looking at a traditional perfect season, in which each alter-
native plays only one match with the other alternatives, we notice that the value of
α affects the impact of an upset. Table 7 shows that as the value of α increases, the
significance of the upset also increases. In turn, depending on the application, the
value of α will determine the tradeoff between the sensitivity of the method and the
reward for winning a competition. In this particular example, A5 jumps up to 3rd
place when α = 3, and then doesnt jump up to 2nd place until α = 6. A5 doesnt
become tied with A1 for 1st place until α is very large, whereas with the (0,1) voting
scheme, it is tied for 1st place immediately following the upset.
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis of (0,1) and (1,α) Voting Schemes
In this section, we will show a general relationship that represents the sensitivity
of the two voting schemes, particularly in their tail. Again, we begin with a perfect
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Table 4.7
(1,α) method rating for perfect season with upset, varying α
α =
2 3 4 5 6 10 50 1000
π1 0.227 0.244 0.255 0.262 0.267 0.277 0.288 0.290
π2 0.214 0.216 0.216 0.214 0.213 0.208 0.197 0.194
π3 0.193 0.184 0.176 0.170 0.165 0.154 0.135 0.129
π4 0.175 0.159 0.148 0.140 0.135 0.122 0.102 0.097
π5 0.191 0.197 0.205 0.213 0.220 0.240 0.277 0.290
season of n alternatives. This time, however, our perfect season will be a round robin
tournament with one competitive match between each set of alternatives.
It is difficult to quantify a unit of measurement for the sensitivity of a ranking
method to upset events. However, we can indirectly measure the sensitivity by ob-
serving how easily an alternative can change their ranking with a small change in
performance. For example, if the difference in rating between two consecutive alter-
natives is very small, it will take only a slight increase in rating value to move up a
ranking spot.

















The rating vector for the (1,α) voting scheme is difficult to generalize, but we can find
an iterative relationship between πj and πj+1 that will help us with our sensitivity
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0 1 1 . . . 1
α 0 1 . . . 1








































n−1 . . . 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
From the matrix, P , we see that two consecutive alternatives can be represented by
an iterative relationship, and we obtain the following relationship regarding the final
rating vector:
πj =
[(j + 1)α + n− (j + 1)][(j − 1)α + n− j]
[jα + n− (j + 1)][(j − 1)α + n− (j − 1)]πj+1 (4.2)
This expression is derived from the fact that for any two consecutive alternatives,
their associated columns are identical except for the 2x2 matrix at the intersection
of i and j.
Another important relationship we obtain from the transition probability matrix
is the ratio of π1 to πn. When simplified, we see the following equation for the (1,α)




(n− 1)α + 1
n+ α− 1 (4.3)
This relationship will be used later in this chapter when we derive the sensitivity ratio
expression.
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4.5.1 Range of ratings based on voting scheme
The range of ratings is significantly different depending on the voting scheme.
In the (0,1) voting scheme, the ratings of the first and last ranked alternatives are
related by a ratio of n. In turn, as the number of alternatives increases, the ratio of






For the (0, 1) voting scheme, as the number of alternatives approaches infinity, so
does the ratio of the ratings of the first and last ranked alternatives.
Now, lets observe what happens with the same ratio for the (1,α) voting scheme.
In this case, the number of alternatives does not affect the range of ratings, as α is a
constant value. To better understand the sensitivity, in the next section we obtain a







(n− 1)α + 1
n+ α− 1 = α (4.5)
4.5.2 Sensitivity based on incremental rating analysis
We propose to find a ratio that can serve as an indicator of how sensitive the two
voting schemes are in general, particularly to a tailing effect. One could look at the
difference in ratings between consecutive alternatives to see how much is needed to
pass that alternative in the ranking. However, that value alone is not enough; we need
to compare the largest and smallest increments in the ratings to see the difference. For
a perfect season scenario, the difference in rating values for consecutive alternatives,
πi − πi+1, will decrease as i increases. The difference in rating values of the first and
second ranked alternatives will be the largest, and the difference in rating values of
the last two alternatives will be the smallest. Thus, we define the following ratio to
measure the sensitivity for both voting schemes:
Rs =
π1 − π2
πn−1 − πn (4.6)
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We will find the limit of this ratio as n → ∞. The larger the ratio becomes, the more
sensitive the ranking will be, especially in its tail, because the necessary rating points
to move up a ranking spot become very small.
(0,1) voting scheme
First, we examine the (0,1) voting scheme and its sensitivity ratio of rating incre-




















The expression shows that the ratio grows polynomially with respect to n, which
indicates that increments become extremely small in the tail of the rating vector as
n grows large. This indicates extreme sensitivity, because only a small increment is
needed to jump up a ranking spot. Also, there is no way to control the sensitivity,
in that the number of alternatives is not determined by the user when conducting a
complete ranking.
(1,α) voting scheme
Next, we examine the (1,α) voting scheme and its ratio of rating increments, Rs.
Again, we start with our previously derived iterative relationship and obtain:
Rs =
π1 − π2
πn−1 − πn =
π1[(n− 1)α][(n− 2)α + 2]
πnα[(2α + n− 2)(n− 1)] (4.10)
We have a relationship for the ratio of π1 to πn, so we simplify the above expression
to obtain:
Rs =
n3α2 − 4n2α2 + 3n2α + 5nα2 − 7nα− 2α2 + 4α + 2n− 2
n3 + 3n2α + 2nα2 − 7nα− 4n2 − 2α2 + 4α + 5n− 2 (4.11)
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In this case, our ratio value does not depend on the number of alternatives, n. Re-
gardless of the number of alternatives, the ratio of increments will be a constant
value, indicating that we can control the level of sensitivity. This result explains the
example in the previous section, and will an even greater impact to other scenarios
that use the Markov method to obtain rankings, especially those that have a large
number of alternatives.
It is important to note that this does not indicate that the (0,1) voting scheme is
worse than the (1,α) voting scheme, only that it is less robust and can exhibit erratic
behavior in the case of upsets, especially as n grows large. Table 4.8 summarizes the
theoretical findings of the sensitivity of the two voting schemes.
Table 4.8
Sensitivity of voting schemes
(0,1) voting scheme (1,α) voting scheme
Rs ∞ α2
limn→∞( π1πn ) n α
The primary advantage of the (1,α) voting scheme is that the degree of sensitivity
is controlled by the user. Again, a higher value of α will lead to more sensitivity but
also more dispersion in ratings, whereas a lower value of α will lead to less sensitivity
but a condensed range of ratings.
In the (0,1) voting scheme, the sensitivity is dictated by the number of alternatives,




In conclusion, we found that the new (1,α) voting scheme eliminates the potential
of a periodic Markov chain, which is possible with the (0,1) voting scheme. Peri-
odicity can harm the integrity of a ranking because it ignores potential dominance
relationships among alternatives.
We found through both an example and theory that the (1,α) voting scheme
exhibits a more robust behavior towards upset events than the (0,1) voting scheme,
especially in the tail of its rating vector as the number of alternatives increases.
In everyday context, this improvement can help with all applications of ranking
methods that use Markov chains. Since all applications have upset events, whether
they occur in sports team rankings or recommender systems, it is imperative to have
a ranking method that is less sensitive to those events.
In this particular study, we have focused solely on the rankings of alternatives, and
not the rating values. Further investigation is needed to examine the interpretation
of the rating values when using the (0,1) voting scheme or the (1,α) voting scheme.
Additional work can be done on finding the optimal value of α based on the
application. Again, a larger value of α value provides more confidence in selections
but will also be more sensitive to upset events.
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5. AXIOMS OF RANKING
5.1 Introduction
It is often necessary to determine the importance of an alternative compared to
others in a similar group. The process of ordering a list of alternatives based on their
relative strength is referred to as ranking. Generally, a ranking method will develop
this list by assigning a rating for each alternative in a set, and then ordering the
alternatives in decreasing order of rating. Ranking methods are used for a wide array
of applications, including but not limited to sports teams [1, 2, 5–7, 9, 12, 27, 28], web
search engines [19, 29, 30], and recommender systems [20,31].
Pairwise comparison methods are a subset of ranking methods. These methods
have been used for many years [17, 32], and are still being used in widespread appli-
cations today. In this paper, we focus on pairwise comparison ranking methods with
applications primarily to sports. We refer to the alternatives being ranked as teams,
and the individual pairwise comparison data as matches or games.
In sports ranking applications, the consequences can be significant. Many sports
leagues determine participants for tournaments or playoffs based on the ranking of
its teams. Thus, a fair and accurate ranking is essential to properly determine the
best team(s) in a league, and the best or most fitting ranking method should be
used. There is considerable literature that examines different ranking methods and
measures their predictive power and performance [10, 11, 24, 33, 34].
However, it is difficult to rank the ranking methods themselves, because each
method has different strengths and weaknesses. For example, many professional
leagues (i.e., NFL, NBA, and MLB) consider only the total number of wins and
losses when ranking its teams, which fails to take into account several factors such as
the quality of a match victory, the strength of schedule, etc. However, some ranking
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methods that take the quality of a match opponent into account, fail to properly
reward a team for winning a match. In turn, different methods consider a different
subset of the available information obtained from a match result.
The objective of this study is to develop a list of satisficing axioms that, when
followed, guarantee a fair and comprehensive ranking method. In other words, if
the axioms are satisfied, the ranking method will not dismiss any of the available
information directly obtained from a match result.
We will study five popular pairwise comparison ranking methods with applications
primarily to sports, all of which were recently highlighted in Whos #1? The Science
of Rating and Ranking [10]: the traditional Win-Loss method, the Massey method [1],
the Colley method [2], the Markov method [7, 10], and the Elo method [16]. These
methods will be evaluated on their ability to satisfy the axioms developed in this
paper. Later we introduce a recently proposed modification to the Markov method
[34] and show that under certain parametric conditions, the method will satisfy the
axioms.
It is important to note that these ranking methods are primarily useful to rank
in tournament setups similar to that of a round-robin tournament. For example,
single-elimination style tournaments do not need rankings, because the winner will
be decided by the structure of the tournament (however, in some cases, a ranking is
useful to help develop the initial seeding and placement of teams in the tournament).
The design of a tournament is, however, important to examine when electing which
ranking method to use, because different designs have varying characteristics [35].
The scope of this study is limited to tournament or league setups in which the
teams play an equal number of matches, but they do not necessarily need to play
each team in the league. In some cases, such as the English Premier League (EPL)
in soccer, it is a pure round-robin in which each team in the league plays an equal
number of matches against each other team in the league. However, another example
is the National Football League (NFL), in which each team plays 16 total matches, but
will not play every other team in the league. The National Basketball Association
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(NBA) is somewhat a hybrid of the previous two examples. Each team plays 82
matches, and each team will play every other team in the league, but they will not
be an equal number of matches between each team. However, all three of the above
mentioned leagues setups are acceptable for our study. We also note that there are
many different tools in sports analytics that can be used to improve the predictive
power of a ranking method, many of which are highlighted in recent literature [36].
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 will outline the five
ranking methods that we will study, and give a brief description of the strengths and
weaknesses of each method. Section 3 will introduce the axioms and the motivation
behind them. Section 4 will map the five ranking methods from Section 2 to the
ranking axioms in Section 3, and determine which methods satisfy which axioms. In
Section 5, we conjecture that a recently proposed modification to the Markov method
can indeed satisfy all three axioms. Section 6 will discuss our results and future
research considerations.
5.2 Ranking Methods
In this section, we outline five popular sports ranking methods and discuss their
relative strengths and weaknesses: 1) the Win-Loss method, 2) the Massey method,
3) the Colley method, 4) the Markov method, and 5) the Elo method. In Section 4,
we will revisit these methods and evaluate their ability to satisfy the set of ranking
axioms developed in Section 3.
5.2.1 Win-Loss method
The first method we examine is the traditional Win-Loss method, which is the
most commonly used method, especially in professional sports. The method is very
intuitive, and requires little to no modeling to obtain its ratings. Simply sum up
the total number of wins and losses in competitive matches for all teams, and assign
rating values for each team equal to the total number of wins. Some leagues look at
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win percentage, but in leagues with equal number of matches, this will result in an
identical ranking vector.
The advantage to this ranking method is that it provides a clear and direct incen-
tive to win each match. Also, the result of external matches will not affect a specific
teams rating value. However, the disadvantage is that each win is treated the same,
regardless of the strength of opponent or the margin of victory. For example, two
teams could end up with an equal number of wins, but one team faced much stronger
opponents than the other team faced. The team that faced stronger opponents is
more likely a stronger team and should have a greater rating value, but the Win-Loss
method will not identify that rating difference.
5.2.2 Massey method
Kenneth Massey developed the Massey method in 1997 to rank college football
teams using the theory of least squares [1]. The concept in this ranking method is
that the difference in the ratings of two teams should equal the difference in the score
of their competition. The fundamental equation for the ranking method is written as
follows:
Mr = p (5.1)
In the above equation, M is the Massey matrix, r is the unknown rating vector, and
p is a vector of cumulative point differentials. The Massey matrix is comprised of the
diagonal element Mii which is equal to the total number of games played by team i,
and the element Mij which is the negation of the number of games played between
team i and j. Because the linear system does not have a unique solution, one of
the rows of the Massey matrix must be replaced with all ones and the corresponding
entry of the right-hand side vector with a zero. The solution to this revised system
of linear equations above will give the rating vector.
It is important to note that the point differential vector does not take into account
the scoring margins against specific teams, only the cumulative sum for each individ-
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ual team. In turn, a large cumulative point differential can be obtained from defeating
weaker opponents by large amounts, which isnt necessarily a strong indicator of team
quality.
The Massey method was used by the NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) in
calculating the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) rankings. The BCS rankings were
used from 1998−2013 to determine the two teams that would play for the National
Championship, as well as several other major bowl games.
5.2.3 Colley method
Next, we examine the Colley method, which was developed in 2002 by Wesley
Colley [2]. This method also solves a system of linear equations, but has different
definitions for its matrix and its right-hand side vector. Let wi equal the number of
wins for team i, li equal the number of losses for team i, ti equal the total number of
games played by team i, and nij equal the number of times teams i and j play each
other. The equation for the ranking method is written as follows:
Cr = b (5.2)
In this equation, C is the Colley matrix, r is the unknown rating vector, and b is a





2 + ti i = j
−nij i = j
(5.3)
bi = 1 +
1
2
(wi − li) (5.4)
Again, solving the system of linear equations for the unknown rating vector will
provide a ranking of the teams. A shortcoming, however, of the Colley method is
that the strength of an individual opponent is not taken into consideration, only the
total number of wins and losses. In fact, the strengths and weaknesses of the Colley
56
method are similar to those of the Massey method, the only difference being one
accounts for total point differential and the other total win differential.
5.2.4 Markov method
The Markov method [7, 10], in its general form, can be thought of as a pairwise
comparison ranking method that uses Markov chains to rate and rank its teams. The
main concept of the method is that each individual competition between two teams
results in the losing team voting for the winning team. These collection of votes will
populate a matrix that represents the head-to-head competitions between all of the
teams. Next, transform the voting matrix into a stochastic matrix by normalizing
its rows. The stochastic matrix will ultimately provide the steady-state probability
vector, which is equivalent to the rating vector.
There are many ways to construct the final rating vector, which can be calculated
from a linear combination of several stochastic matrices. For example, one voting
matrix could contain information on just wins and losses, and another voting matrix
could contain information on score differentials. In this study, we will use the basic
form of voting only for wins and losses. We refer to this as the (0,1) Markov method.
(The losing team receives a 0 vote from the winning team and the winning team
receives 1 vote from the losing team.)
The major advantage of the Markov method is that takes the quality of the victory
into account, meaning a victory over a stronger opponent will be valued higher than
a victory over a weaker opponent, as will be shown later.
A major drawback of the Markov method, however, is that it is sensitive to small
changes in data, especially in its tail, and can exhibit faulty behavior under these
circumstances [11, 34]. In fact, in some extreme cases, teams will have incentive to
lose a match to increase their rating.
57
5.2.5 Elo method
Finally, we observe the Elo rating method [16], that was initially developed in
1960 to rate chess players. Since then, the method has become popular outside of the
chess world, and other outlets have used the method to rank sports teams. Recently,
Nate Silver’s FiveThirtyEight blog used the method to successfully rank teams in
both the NFL and NBA.
After each player (or team) participates in a match, their rating is modified by
the following formula:
rnew = rold +K(S − μ) (5.5)
In this equation, K is a constant determined by the nature of the competition, S is an
indicator variable that reflects the outcome of the match, and μ is a logistic function





The Elo method is strong because it gives a clear and direct incentive for a win,
and external matches do not directly impact a teams performance. It also takes into
account the quality of the opponent in the match. However, one drawback of the Elo
method is that it continuously changes over time, and thus the order of matches for
a team can have a significant impact on their Elo rating.
5.3 Ranking Axioms
In this section, we construct a set of axioms that a fair and (data) comprehensive
ranking method should follow. To be fair, a ranking method must provide the teams
being ranked with consistent objectives. The objective for each team is simple: win
the match. In turn, winning a match should always result in at least as good of a
rating as before, and losing a match should never result in an increased rating (i.e., a
team should never have incentive to lose a match). To be complete, a ranking method
must examine the information that can be obtained from each match, and adequately
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assess and rank the teams based on that information. When two teams compete, we
consider the outcome of the match as the information obtained. This includes both
the match winner (or in some cases, there is a tie) and the match score. Additional
information (such as strategic formations, or roster assignments) could be obtained
from a match result based on the nature of the sport, but that level of analytics is
beyond our scope of evaluating the ranking methods.
There is some debate as to whether or not the score differential of a match is a
good indicator of team performance. On one hand, Redmond [37] found that score
differential can often be a misleading characteristic in determining the strength of
a team, and more emphasis should be placed on gaining the victory. On the other
hand, there are successful ranking methods, such as the Massey method [1], that
have been used and primarily consider score differential. In the EPL, and many other
international soccer leagues, score differential is used as a tiebreaker when two teams
have an equal rating. In leagues such as the MLB, NFL, and NBA, score differential
is not taken into account, and the tiebreakers are usually determined by head-to-head
match results. For our study, score differential is optional information to use when
ranking teams. It is advantageous to have the capability to use score differential, but
it is not a requirement based on the axioms we construct.
5.3.1 Axiom I: opponent strength
Our first axiom is based on the idea that each match victory is not equivalent,
and that some victories contain more information than others. For example, it would
be misleading to give a similar award for beating the best team in the league as
opposed to beating the worst team in the league. Clearly, beating the best team
indicates that you are a stronger team than if you had beaten the worst team. Thus,
a comprehensive ranking method must take into account the quality of a victory when
calculating the rating of a team.
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On the other hand, not all losses are equivalent. For example, it would be mis-
leading to give a similar penalty for losing to the best team in the league as opposed
to losing to the worst team in the league, for the same reasoning as listed above. So,
a comprehensive ranking method must also take into account the quality of a loss
when calculating the rating of a team.
Axiom I.: The strength of an opponent from a specific match result should be a
factor in calculating the rating of a team.
As stated previously, the score differential of a match can often be misleading
information when calculating team ratings. Thus, the extension for Axiom I is a soft
axiom, or otherwise an optional axiom.
Axiom Ia. (optional): The margin of victory over an opponent from a specific
match result should be a factor in calculating the rating of a team.
If point differential is used in calculating team ratings, it is strongly recommended
that there be a smoothing function of sorts to delineate the impact, similar to Keener’s
approach [12]. For example, defeating a team 21-0 should not have the same impact as
defeating a team 49-28, as the first score shows stronger dominance from the winning
team.
5.3.2 Axiom II: incentive to win
The next axiom aims to unify the objective for each competitive match, which is
simply to win the match. This axiom is rather self-evident, but is extremely important
to the integrity of any ranking method. For example, if a team has incentive to lose
a match to increase its rating, that will dilute the information obtained from that
match. The information used by the ranking method relies on the fact that in each
individual match, both teams are trying to win.
In most ranking methods, this axiom will hold true. However, as we will see
later in this chapter, some methods rely too heavily on the strength of opponents to
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calculate ratings, and this can result in erratic cases where teams have incentive to
lose a match.
Axiom II.: A team should always have a clear incentive to win a match to increase
its rating.
It is important to note that the converse of this axiom is not strictly true, but
only partially true. Obtaining a victory over a significantly inferior opponent may
not improve the rating, but it should not harm it. Also, losing to a strong opponent
may not decrease your rating, but it should not be preferred to defeating that same
opponent.
Axiom II also indirectly implies that strong interdependence between teams’ rat-
ings can have a negative impact on the ranking vector. Chartier et al. [11] analyzed
several ranking methods and their sensitivity, and found a specific case in the NFL
where a high interdependence in ratings can lead to teams having an incentive to lose
a match. We will see in Section 4 how Axiom I and Axiom II will often be in direct
conflict with each other due to the nature of their objectives. Basically, the more
a ranking method factors in the strength of opponent, the stronger interdependence
exists between rating values. This can ultimately lead to cases where there exists an
incentive to lose.
5.3.3 Axiom III: sequence of matches
Teams do not select the sequence of their match schedule. In some collegiate
sports, like NCAA football and basketball, teams can dictate their out of confer-
ence schedule, but they have no control over their conference schedule. In major
professional sports (NBA, NFL, MLB, EPL), teams do not select the order of their
matches.
In turn, it would be unfair to award or penalize teams differently based on the
sequence of their matches. So, if we were to reorder the matches of a season, the
rating and ranking vector should not change. In most ranking methods, this is the
61
case, because the results are tallied and tabulated in a static formula. However, if a
ranking method did not adhere to this idea, it can be viewed as an unfair ranking
method. Again, this is not to call attention to the quality of opponents on the
schedule, only the order in which the matches are played.
Axiom III.: The specific sequence of matches should not influence the rating and
ranking of a team.
We now have a list of three axioms that we declare all ranking methods should
satisfy to be both fair and complete.
5.4 Ranking Methods and Axioms
In this section, we analyze the five ranking methods from Section 2, and whether
or not they follow the axioms developed in Section 3.
5.4.1 Axiom I review
Axiom I states that the strength of an opponent should have an impact on the
team rating following a specific match. If a team rating changes an equal amount
regardless of the opponent, then Axiom I is not satisfied.
The Win-Loss method, the Massey method, and the Colley method violate Axiom
I. For the Win-Loss method, a team can win or lose against the strongest or weakest
team in the league, and their rating will change by the same amount. For the Massey
method, wins and losses are not considered, only total score differential is considered.
In turn, a team can score many points against weak teams and have a higher rating
than a team that defeated strong teams by a smaller margin of points.
For the Colley method, only the total number of wins is considered, not the indi-
vidual match results. For example, consider a perfect season round robin tournament
consisting of five teams, in which the stronger team wins each match. The ranking is
shown in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1
Perfect season, Colley method
Team Rank Win-Loss Record Colley Rating
A 1 4− 0 0.786
B 2 3− 1 0.643
C 3 2− 2 0.5
D 4 1− 3 0.357
E 5 0− 4 0.214
Now, lets assume that team E had beaten team A, and recalculate the Colley
ratings. The ranking is shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2
Perfect season with upset, Colley method
Team Rank Win-Loss Record Colley Rating
A 1 (tie) 3− 1 0.643
B 1 (tie) 3− 1 0.643
C 3 2− 2 0.5
D 4 (tie) 1− 3 0.357
E 4 (tie) 1− 3 0.357
As you can see, both teams A and B have an equal rating and ranking, but they
each had beaten different teams. The same point can be made for teams D and E,
which have the same rating and ranking but different quality of wins. If the Colley
method considered the quality of a victory into account, both teams A and B and
teams D and E would have different ratings and rankings.
The Elo method and the Markov method both adhere to Axiom I. For the Elo
method, it is clear that the quality of the opponent will affect the rating and beating
a stronger team will improve your rating more than beating a weaker team.
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For the Markov method, as we previously showed, the rating vector directly comes
from the transition probability matrix, which directly comes from the voting matrix.
The voting matrix consists of all head-to-head results between all of the teams, and
obtaining votes from a specific team will impact your rating based on the rating of
that specific team. Mathematically, given the transition probability matrix P , the





From this equation, it can be seen that wins over stronger teams will increase your
rating more than wins over weaker teams.
5.4.2 Axiom II review
Axiom II states that teams should always have incentive to win to improve their
rating. If a team rating increases from losing a match, as opposed to having won that
match, then Axiom II is not satisfied.
The Win-Loss method, Massey method, Colley method, and Elo method all follow
Axiom II, and there is always a clear incentive for teams to win the next match to
improve their rating. It is not possible to improve your rating with a loss in any
of these four methods, and in most cases, the rating will decrease as a result of a
loss. There are cases in which a team can win a match and their ranking will not
improve because the teams ranked ahead also win their matches. However, this does
not violate Axiom II, because we are only concerned with teams having incentive to
lose to improve their rating.
The Markov method, on the other hand, can have cases where teams have an
incentive to lose to improve their rating, thus violating Axiom II. There is a strong
interdependency in the team ratings when using the Markov method, and this can
cause erratic behavior in the rating vector. Lets look at two examples, one theoretical
and one case study, to illustrate this point.
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Again, consider a perfect season round robin tournament consisting of five teams,
in which the stronger team wins each match. The ranking is shown in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3
Perfect season, Markov method
Team Rank Win-Loss Record Markov Rating
A 1 4− 0 0.438
B 2 3− 1 0.219
C 3 2− 2 0.146
D 4 1− 3 0.109
E 5 0− 4 0.088
Next, we will add an upset in which team E instead had defeated team A. The
ranking can be seen in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4
Perfect season with upset, Markov method
Team Rank Win-Loss Record Markov Rating
A 1 (tie) 3− 1 0.29
E 1 (tie) 1− 3 0.29
B 3 3− 1 0.144
C 4 2− 2 0.129
D 5 1− 3 0.097
Notice that the worst team E is now rated and ranked equally with the best team
A, which shows how sensitive the Markov method can be to upsets. To see what is
meant by having an incentive to lose, lets add another upset. Imagine that the last
match is still to be played between team A and team D. If team A beats team D, we
are left with the ranking from Table 5.4. However, lets see what happens if team A
intentionally loses the match to team D.
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Table 5.5
Perfect season with two upsets, Markov method
Team Rank Win-Loss Record Markov Rating
A 1 2− 2 0.293
B 2 3− 1 0.22
D 3 2− 2 0.195
C 4 (tie) 2− 2 0.146
E 4 (tie) 1− 3 0.146
From Table 5.5, not only did losing the match improve team A’s rating, but it
put them alone in first place. Both the rating and ranking for team A improved with
losing that match. Although this theoretical example proves our point, lets also take
a look at a real-world case study where this can take place.
For a real-world example, consider the 2011 NFL season, in which the Green Bay
Packers (GB) were 15− 1 and had the best record in the league. Their only loss was
to the Kansas City Chiefs (KC), who merely went 7− 9, but had obtained an upset
win over GB. When used to rank the 2011 season, the Markov method ranks KC as
the first place team in the league. (Clearly, with a 7 − 9 record, it should not have
been ranked as the best team in the league.) GB, on the other hand, was ranked 3rd
even though they had the best record in the league.
If GB had lost a second match, it would have changed the rating vector completely.
We select the matchup between GB and the Chicago Bears (two bitter rivals, which
makes the potential of an upset more likely) as the test match. If GB had decided
to lose this match, we observe that not only does it improve its rating, but it also
improves its ranking to the first place team in the league. Table 5.6 shows an excerpt
of both the actual 2011 NFL season Markov ratings, and the modified season with the
incentive to lose case. It is clear that the incentive to lose a match to improve a rating
exists in both theoretical examples and case studies. By losing an additional match
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Table 5.6
2011 NFL season with modifications, Markov method
2011 Season 2011 Season, modified
Rank Team Record Markov Rating Rank Team Record Markov Rating
1 KC 7− 9 7.24 1 GB 14− 2 6.04
2 BAL 12− 4 6.14 2 BAL 12− 4 5.93
3 GB 15− 1 5.61 3 CHI 9− 7 5.15
4 PIT 12− 4 4.72 4 KC 7− 9 5.11
5 SF 13− 3 4.6 5 SF 13− 3 4.63
to CHI, GB significantly improved their rating from 5.61 to 6.04 (∼ 8% increase)
and also improved their ranking from 3rd to 1st place. Again, the sensitivity of the
Markov method is displayed by the overinflated ratings for CHI and KC because of
their upset victories over GB.
5.4.3 Axiom III review
Axiom III states that the sequence of matches on a team’s schedule should not
have an impact on their rating. At the end of the season, if a team rating changes
based on the order of matches, then Axiom III is violated.
The Win-Loss method, Massey method, Colley method, and Markov method all
satisfy Axiom III, and no team rating will change based on the order of matches. The
Win-Loss method purely sums up the total number of wins, which will not change
based on the order of matches. The Massey, Colley, and Markov methods all use
matrices and/or vectors as inputs, and these are the sums of wins or points scored
over the course of the season. Thus, the order of matches will not affect the entries
of the matrices or vectors.
The Elo method, however, does depend on the order of matches, and thus violates
Axiom III. We applied the Elo method to several NFL seasons and notice that chang-
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ing the order of matches changes the final rating of the teams. We considered 1) the
actual order, 2) the reverse order, and 3) a random order. In fact, in examining the
NFL 2012 season, we notice that the order of matches would actually change which
teams were selected to the playoffs. (The NFL selects the four division champions,
and then the next two highest rated teams from each conference for the playoffs.)
Table 5.7 shows Elo ratings for the National Football Conference (NFC) in the
NFL 2012 season with matches in the actual order. The teams in bold font are the
teams that would be selected for the playoffs.
Table 5.7
Elo ratings for NFC in NFL 2012 season, actual order of matches
NFC East NFC North NFC South NFC West
WAS 1525 GB 1548 ATL 1584 SF 1558
NYG 1520 CHI 1539 TB 1484 SEA 1545
DAL 1503 MIN 1529 CAR 1478 STL 1492
PHI 1442 DET 1441 NO 1478 ARI 1463
Now, lets observe what happens if we simply reverse the sequence of matches when
calculating Elo rating values. Of the 16 teams in the NFC, only San Francisco (SF)
Table 5.8
Elo ratings for NFC in NFL 2012 season, reverse order of matches
NFC East NFC North NFC South NFC West
WAS 1541 GB 1551 ATL 1572 SF 1558
NYG 1515 MIN 1540 CAR 1491 SEA 1555
DAL 1500 CHI 1528 NO 1490 STL 1496
PHI 1428 DET 1434 TB 1483 ARI 1446
had the same rating based on a different order of matches. In addition, many teams
changed their rank in their division as well. Most noticeably, in the NFC North, the
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Chicago Bears (CHI) and the Minnesota Vikings (MIN) swapped rank. Because they
were fighting for sixth and final Wild Card spot in the playoffs, the order of matches
actually affected which team would be selected for the playoffs. Clearly, the order of
matches will affect the final team rating when using the Elo method, thus Axiom III
is violated.
In summary, all five of the ranking methods violated exactly one of the ranking
axioms. Table 5.9 provides a summary of our findings.
Table 5.9
Summary of ranking methods and axioms
Method Axiom I Axiom II Axiom III
Win-Loss × YES YES
Massey × YES YES
Colley × YES YES
Markov YES × YES
Elo YES YES ×
5.5 Proposed Method to Satisfy Axioms
In this section, we propose a recently developed method by Vaziri et al. [34] that
is an extension of the Markov method, but with a modified voting scheme, referred
to as the (1, α) method. Applied to the NFL seasons 2002 − 2011 and under specific
parametric conditions for α, we observe that this method adheres to all three axioms.
Before we examine this method, it is important to discuss the possibility of tweak-
ing the other methods to satisfy the axioms. For the Win-Loss, Massey, and Colley
methods, it is not possible to modify the method to take Axiom I into account. The
nature of the methods rely on aggregation of wins and losses (or score differential in
Masseys case), and having uniform reward for winning a match. Also, there is no
individual mapping of a match result to a specific opponent. This is consistent with
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the findings from Chartier et al. [11] when they showed that the Massey and Colley
methods had a uniformly spaced rating vector for a perfect season.
Next, the Elo method cannot be modified to fit Axiom III. The nature of the
method depends on the timing of a win or a loss, because the ratings of teams are
continuously changing. A potential modification could be to generate all possible
orders of matches, and compute an average rating for each team based on every
possible order. However, even for leagues with short seasons such as the NFL, there
would be 17! ∼ 1014 combinations of schedules.
The (1, α) method uses a voting scheme that is a modification to the traditional
(0, 1) voting scheme of the Markov method. In the (1, α) method voting scheme, the
winning team will vote a value of 1 to the losing team, and the losing team will vote
a value of α > 1 to the winning team. Another way to view this voting scheme is
that when two teams play each other, they are always connected by two arcs. The
weight of the arcs is dependent on who wins the match. The winner will have a higher
weight, or more “flow” coming in from the loser. The remainder of the method is the
same algorithm as the traditional Markov method. The parameter α is selected by
the user, and represents the confidence that the winning team is indeed the better
team. An advantage of the (1, α) method is that it significantly reduces the sensitivity
of the Markov method, as shown in [34], while maintaining the integrity of the rank
order.
Since the (1, α) method is a modification of the Markov method, it will follow
Axioms I and III for the same reasons of the traditional method. However, since
the (1, α) method also reduces the sensitivity of the Markov method, upsets have a
much smaller impact than in the traditional scheme. Thus, in many cases, the (1, α)
method will also adhere to Axiom II and not provide incentive to lose.
We are not able to rigorously prove that the (1, α) method will satisfy Axiom II
for all values of α, because as α grows very large, the method converges to the (0, 1)
markov method and will have the same properties. However, for smaller values of α,
we observe that the incentive to lose no longer exists, and Axiom II will be satisfied.
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We revisit the previous example, in which we demonstrated the incentive to lose
for team A using the Markov method. This time we use the (1, α) method for α = 2,
and observe the behavior of the ranking. The ranking for the (1, α) method for a
perfect season round robin tournament of five teams is shown in Table 5.10. Again,
Table 5.10
Perfect season, (1, α) method, α = 2
Team Rank Win-Loss Record (1, α) Rating
A 1 4− 0 0.244
B 2 3− 1 0.218
C 3 2− 2 0.196
D 4 1− 3 0.178
E 5 0− 4 0.163
we add an upset in which team E instead had defeated team A. The ranking can be
seen in Table 5.11.
Table 5.11
Perfect season with upset, (1, α) method, α = 2
Team Rank Win-Loss Record (1, α) Rating
A 1 3− 1 0.227
B 2 3− 1 0.214
C 3 2− 2 0.193
E 4 1− 3 0.191
D 5 1− 3 0.175
Notice that the worst team E only improved its ranking by one spot, as opposed to
in the traditional scheme in which it became rated and ranked equally with the best
team A. Also, team E defeated a stronger team than team D defeated, which is shown
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by the fact that it is rated and ranked ahead of team D. The reduced sensitivity to
upsets and the maintained integrity to opponent strength is well demonstrated here.
Finally, we add the third upset to see if the incentive to lose is available for team
A, by assuming that they intentionally lose the match to team D. From Table 5.12,
Table 5.12
Perfect season with two upsets, (1, α) method, α = 2
Team Rank Win-Loss Record (1, α) Rating
B 1 3− 1 0.217
A 2 2− 2 0.211
D 3 2− 2 0.197
C 4 2− 2 0.196
E 5 1− 3 0.179
losing the match decreased both team A’s rating and ranking. Also, notice that the
ranking is more intuitive than before, in that the rankings closely follow the number
of wins and losses for all teams, regardless of the number of upsets.
Next, as we did before, we observe the 2011 NFL season using the (1, α) method,
and whether or not there is incentive for GB to lose a match to improve its rating and
ranking. First, we show an excerpt of the season ranking based on different values of
α, as seen in Table 5.13.
Note that as α grows large, the rating and ranking vector converges to that of the
traditional (0, 1) voting scheme of the Markov method. Next, we add the same upset
as we did before (CHI beats GB in one match), and notice the effect it has on the
final season rankings to see if GB had incentive to lose an additional match.
For any value of α ≤ 5, there was no incentive to lose, and thus, Axiom II is
satisfied. However, once α ≥ 10, the incentive to lose existed for GB because their
rating increased. On analyzing data from the NFL seasons from 2002 to 2011, we
found that for α values less than 5, there is never an incentive to lose a match. For
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Table 5.13
(1, α) method ratings for 2011 NFL season
α = 2 α = 10 α = 20 α = 100
Rank Team Rating Team Rating Team Rating Team Rating
1 GB 4.055 GB 5.594 GB 5.76 KC 6.656
2 NO 3.658 BAL 5.057 BAL 5.489 BAL 5.984
3 BAL 3.639 NO 4.387 KC 5.212 GB 5.698
4 SF 3.602 SF 4.378 SF 4.505 PIT 4.612
5 PIT 3.553 KC 4.342 PIT 4.345 SF 4.589
Table 5.14
(1, α) method ratings for 2011 NFL season with modification
α = 2 α = 10 α = 20 α = 100
Rank Team Rating Team Rating Team Rating Team Rating
1 GB 3.953 GB 5.48 GB 5.771 GB 5.994
2 NO 3.66 BAL 5.011 BAL 5.4 BAL 5.808
3 BAL 3.637 NO 4.468 CHI 4.645 CHI 5.026
4 SF 3.6 SF 4.374 NO 4.52 KC 4.912
5 PIT 3.551 CHI 4.33 SF 4.507 SF 4.61
values 10 or greater, there were instances where losing a match was beneficial for a
team.
The table below shows the number of matches in the season when a team had an
incentive to lose for different values of α. One can also think of the values in this
table as the number of times Axiom II was violated. The last row shows the number
of matches where a team had an incentive to lose in the (0, 1) Markov method. It is
mentioned in Vaziri et al [34], that the rating vector obtained from the (1, α) method
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should converge to the rating vector obtained from the (0,1) Markov method for large
values of α. The last two rows of Table 5.15 provide evidence of this convergence. (In
2007, the New England Patriots were undefeated, and thus as a result of the dangling
node adjustment [19], the (0, 1) method did not have an incentive to lose.)
Table 5.15
Matches when the victor had incentive to lose - NFL Seasons 2002−2011
(1, α) NFL Seasons
Method ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 2
20 1 0 1 8 0 0 0 4 1 7
100 1 2 5 13 4 3 5 9 2 11
1000000 2 2 5 14 6 3 5 16 2 14
(0,1) method 2 2 5 14 6 0 5 16 2 14
It is important to test and verify a value for α depending on the league size and
the number of matches played by each team. In the MLB or NBA, for example,
different values of α could satisfy Axiom II. A future study is required that finds the
relationship and/or threshold of α based on other league parameters to guarantee
satisfaction of Axiom II.
It should be noted that our aim is only to show that the (1, α) method satisfies
all three axioms, and thus is a fair and complete ranking method. Modification is
required based on the sport and tournament structure to improve the predictive power
of the (1, α) method. Examples of these modifications include but are not limited
to: finding an optimal α that minimizes sensitivity and maximizes confidence level
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in victory, incorporating home and away advantages, incorporating score differential,
etc.
5.6 Conclusion
In summary, we have outlined a set of ranking axioms that all fair and compre-
hensive pairwise comparison ranking methods should follow. The opponent strength
in a match result should impact your rating, there should never be an incentive to
lose a match to improve your rating, and the order of matches should not influence
the final rating vector.
We reviewed five popular sports ranking methods and found that none of the
five adhered to all three of the axioms, although all of them satisfied exactly two of
the axioms. The Win-Loss, Massey, and Colley methods did not take the opponent
strength into account when rewarding a team for a victory. The Markov method is
extremely sensitive, and thus has cases where a team has incentive to lose a match
to improve its rating and ranking. The Elo method provides different team ratings
based on the order of matches played, which is oftentimes (and always, in major
professional sports) not in the teams’ control.
Last, we conjectured that a newly proposed modification to the Markov method,
known as the (1, α) method, will satisfy all three axioms under certain parametric
conditions. We showed both a generic and case study example where the (1, α)
method satisfied all three axioms and removed the previous case of having incentive
to lose. However, for large values of α, the methods rating vector converges to the
traditional Markov method rating vector, and Axiom II will be violated. Future work
is needed to identify a relationship between α and league parameters that guarantees
that Axiom II will be satisfied.
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6. CONCLUSION
In summary, this dissertation document focused on research pertaining to the (1)
application, (2) theory, and (3) framework for Markov-based ranking methods.
Application
In Chapter 3, we introduced the Crowd-Ranking method, which is an extension of
the conventional Markov method applied to a recruiting scenario. This method uses
collective wisdom and a dual-level decision process to rank a set of groups based on
the quality of the individuals that select those groups.
We applied this method to NCAA football recruiting in the Big Ten conference,
and developed rankings for Big Ten teams’ recruiting classes from 2002−2013. Next,
under the assumption that stronger recruiting rankings tend to indicate stronger team
performance, we measured the predictive power of Crowd-Ranking against Rivals, a
leading service in online recruiting information.
Crowd-Ranking performed significantly better than Rivals at predicting the win-
ner of (1) Big Ten football games and (2) Big Ten conference champions over the
course of 2006−2013.
Theory
Next, we examined the theory behind the Markov method, and one of its major
drawbacks: sensitivity in its tail, especially to upset events. In turn, we introduced
a new voting scheme, the (1, α) method, and compared it to the conventional (0, 1)
method in its ability to perform under undesirable conditions.
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First, we showed rigorously that the (1, α) method could not obtain a periodic
Markov chain, although the (0, 1) method could obtain a periodic Markov chain. This
is an issue because a periodic Markov chain will cause a loss of information in the
rating vector and ranking.
In addition to the periodicity condition, the (0, 1) method was shown to be ex-
tremely sensitive to upsets, particularly in the tail of its rating. We showed, in theory
and in practice, that the (1, α) method subsided much of this sensitivity because it
allowed the user to control the sensitivity of the method with the parameter α. By
obtaining a ratio of rating increments, we saw that the (0, 1) method displayed high
sensitivity, but the (1, α) method was controlled and less erratic.
Framework
Finally, our last step in the research journey was to develop a framework to eval-
uate the (1) fairness and (2) comprehensiveness of ranking methods. We introduced
three fundamental ranking axioms, and the reasoning behind their inclusion. Next,
we introduced five popular sports ranking methods, and examined whether or not
they adhere to the said axioms. We found that all of the methods violated exactly
one axiom, and thus none of them adhered to all three. Last, we introduced our
previously discussed (1, α) method, and showed that under certain parametric con-
ditions for α, it did not violate the axioms when applied to the National Football
League (NFL) from 2002−2011. Further research is required to develop relationships
and conditions for α values and tournament setup to determine whether or not the
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